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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this appeal is vested in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to the
provisions of UCA §78-2-2(3)(j).
IV
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1. 1. Did the trial court err in as a matter of law in ruling that the "after
acquired evidence defense" is a valid defense under Utah law? (Record at pages 726792)
Standard of Review: On a case of first impression, the Court may examine the
issue's treatment in other jurisdictions. De Baiitault v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 913 P.2d
743 (Utah, 1996), Oakridge Energy. Inc. v. Clifton. 937 P.2d 130 (Utah, 1997). However,
this Court is not obliged to follow either or any particular authority in its interpretation.
Mathesonv. Feny. 641 P.2d 674 (Utah, 1982).
2. If the "after acquired evidence defense" is a valid defense under Utah
law, how and when the defense may be asserted? (Record at pages 726-792)
Standard of Review: Standard of Review: On a case of first impression, the
Court may examine the issue's treatment in other jurisdictions. De Baiitault v. Salt Lake
-v-

City Corp.. 913 P.2d 743 (Utah, 1996), Oakridge Energy. Inc. v. Clifton. 937 P.2d 130
(Utah, 1997). However, this Court is not obliged to follow either or any particular
authority in its interpretation. Matheson v. Ferry. 641 P.2d 674 (Utah, 1982).
3. If the "after acquired evidence defense" is a valid defense under Utah
law, what standard of proof a party asserting the defense must meet? (Record at pages
726-792)
Standard of Review: Standard of Review: On a case of first impression, the
Court may examine the issue's treatment in other jurisdictions. De Baritault v. Salt Lake
City Corp.. 913 P.2d 743 (Utah, 1996), Oakridge Energy. Inc. v. Clifton. 937 P.2d 130
(Utah, 1997). However,
this Court is not obliged to follow either or any particular authority in its interpretation.
Matheson v. Ferrv. 641 P.2d 674 (Utah, 1982).
4. If the "after acquired evidence defense" is a valid defense under Utah
law, what facts a party asserting the defense must prove in order to assert the defense?
(Record at pages 726-792)
Standard of Review: Standard of Review: On a case of first impression, the
Court may examine the issue's treatment in other jurisdictions. De Baritault v. Salt Lake
City Corp.. 913 P.2d 743 (Utah, 1996), Oakridge Energy. Inc. v. Clifton. 937 P.2d 130
(Utah, 1997). However, this Court is not obliged to follow either or any particular
authority in its interpretation. Matheson v. Ferry. 641 P.2d 674 (Utah, 1982).

5. If the "after acquired evidence defense" is a valid defense under Utah
-vi-

law, what instructions must be given to a jury regarding the defense? (Record at pages
726-792)
Standard of Review: On a case of first impression, the Court may examine the
issue's treatment in other jurisdictions. De Baritault v. Salt Lake City Corp., 913 P.2d
743 (Utah, 1996), Oakridge Energy. Inc. v. CliftoiL 937 P.2d 130 (Utah, 1997). However,
this Court is not obliged to follow either or any particular authority in its interpretation.
Mathesonv.Ferry. 641 P.2d 674 (Utah, 1982).

V
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES,
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS
STATUTES:
Other than UCA §78-2-2(3)(j) that confers original jurisdiction upon this Court,
Ms. Pett is not aware of any other Utah statutes that are applicable in this case.
RULES:
Ms. Pett is not aware of any Utah court, or other rules that are applicable in this
case.
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VI
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an interlocutory appeal from the Second District Court of Weber County,
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan, granting the appellee peimission to file an amended answer,
a counterclaim and assert the affirmative defense of "after acquired evidence." Because
no Utah court has recognized the "after acquired evidence defense", Ms. Pett is appealing
the trial court's order permitting the appellee to assert the "after acquired evidence
defense," asking the Utah Supreme Court to determine if the "after acquired evidence
defense" exists under Utah law, specify under what conditions the defense may be
asserted, specify the standard of proof necessary to establish the defense, and specify
proper jury instructions relative to the defense, if the defense exists under Utah Law.

B
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT
Ms. Pett filed her Complaint in this matter on December 24, 2001, asserting four
causes of action, i.e., Wrongful Termination of Employment, Breach of Contract, Breach
of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress. The defendant answered Ms. Pett's Complaint on or about February 4, 2002,
and asserted various affirmative defenses. The defendant filed an amended answer to
Ms. Pett's Complaint on August 6, 2002, and asserted various affirmative defenses.

-1-

On or about April 16, 2003, the defendant filed a motion to file an amended
answer to assert alleged newly-discovered counterclaims and the affirmative defense of
"after acquired evidence," claiming that during the course of discovery, the defendant
discovered evidence indicating and/or suggesting that Ms. Pett falsely claimed that she
was unable to work, received disability pay, received FMLA leave, used her vacation and
sick leave, and Ms. Pett falsely submitted medical forms to the defendant substantiating
her medical problems, at a time when Ms. Pett was able to go to Wendover, Nevada, and
allegedly gamble. On June 17, 2003, oral argument was held on the defendant's motion,
and the trial court granted the defendant's motion. Judge Heffernan stated that she
thought it would be an abuse of discretion to deny the motion. The order granting the
appellee's motion to file an amended answer to assert newly-discovered counterclaims
and affirmative defense of "after acquired evidence" was entered on July 15, 2003. Ms.
Pett filed her Petition for an Interlocutory Appeal on August 4, 2003. Ms. Pett's Petition
for an Interlocutory Appeal was granted on September 25, 2003. Ms. Pett filed her
Notice of Appeal on September 29, 2003.
C
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Ms. Pettfiledher Complaint in this matter on December 24, 2001, asserting
four causes of action, i.e., Wrongful Termination of Employment, Breach of Contract,
Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress. (Record at pages 1-23)
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2. The defendant answered Ms. Pett's amended complaint and asserted the
following defenses to Ms. Pett's Amended Complaint:
a) Failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;
b) The defendant acted in good faith and without malice;
c) Ms. Pett's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is barred by the
exclusive provisions of UCA §34A-2-105, et. seq.;
d) Ms. Pett's claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the exclusive remedy
provisions of UCA §34A-2-105, et seq.;
e) Ms. Pett's claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver, laches and/or estoppel;
f) Ms. Pett by her own conduct has waived or released any rights and/or is
estopped from maintaining any action against the defendant;
g) Unclean Hands;
h) Ms. Pett has not been damaged in any manner that would permit recovery of
any damages under law;
i) Ms. Pett was an at-will employee and could be terminated for any reason;
j) Ms. Pett's damages, if any, resulted in whole or part from her actions,
inactions, conduct or performance;
k) Ms. Pett fails to allege facts sufficient to support either equitable relief or an
award of punitive damages;
1) Ms. Pett has failed to mitigate her damages;
m) Ms. Pett's termination was based on legitimate reasons;
n) Ms. Pett fails to allege facts sufficient to support either equitable relief or
-3-

o) An award of punitive damages;l
p) Offset;
q) Attorney's fees pursuant to UCA §78-27-56; and,
r) Reservation of additional affirmative defenses.
(Record at pages 28-42)
3. On or about April 16, 2003, the defendant filed a motion to file an amended
answer to assert newly-discovered counterclaims and affirmative defense of "after
acquired evidence/' claiming that during the course of discovery, the defendant
discovered evidence indicating and/or suggesting that Ms. Pett falsely claimed that she
was unable to work when in fact she was receiving disability pay, receiving FMLA leave,
and using her vacation and sick leave, that Ms. Pett falsely submitted medical forms to
the defendant substantiating her medical problems at a time when Ms. Pett was able to go
to Wendover, Nevada, and allegedly gamble. (Record at pages 1447-1547)
4. Ms. Pett filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion because
the case was approximately eighteen months old and discovery was nearly concluded,
Ms. Pett's medical disabilities were confirmed and diagnosed by prominent and wellrespected medical doctors, permitting the defendant to file an amended answer to assert
newly-discovered counterclaims and affirmative defense would greatly delay the trial and
extend the time required for the trial, and because no Utah court has ever recognized
"after acquired evidence" as a permissible defense under Utah law. Therefore, even

1. The appellee asserts this defense twice, less than two different affirmative defenses, i.e., Eleventh
Affirmative Defense and Fourteenth Affirmative Defense.
-4-

assuming that the trial court was to recognize "after acquired evidence" as a permissible
defense under Utah law, there are no guidelines or standards for the trial court to apply in
determining when the defense can be applied, how it may be applied, what standard of
proof must be applied to the defense, what facts must be proven before the defense can be
asserted, what standard of proof must be applied to the facts supporting the assertion of
the defense before the defense can be asserted, what instructions must be given to the jury
regarding the defense, and what standard of proof the jury must find in order to make a
factual finding that "after acquired evidence" is applicable in a given case under the
specific facts of that case. (Record at pages 564-620)
5. The defendant filed a reply memorandum in support of its motion to file an
amended answer to assert newly-discovered counterclaims and affirmative defense,
admitting that the "after acquired evidence" defense has never been recognized under
Utah law but asserted that because the United States Supreme Court recognized the
defense in a federal case, based on federal law, that the United States Supreme Court
decision was binding on the states. (Record at pages 726-792)
6. On June 17, 2003, oral argument was held on the defendant's motion, and the
trial court granted the defendant's motion. Judge Heffernan stated that she thought it
would be an abuse of discretion to deny the motion. (Record at pages 1153)
7. Based on this "claimed new evidence", the defendant motioned the trial court
for permission to file an amended answer and assert the affirmative defense of "after
acquired evidence" and a counterclaim against Ms. Pett for fraud and/or negligent
representation. (Record at pages 1196-1198)
-5-

8. The trial court's decision was reduced to writing, and on July 15, 2003, die
trial court entered an order granting the defendant's motion. (Record at pages 11961197)
9.

In the trial court's written decision, the trial court did not specify, state,

suggest or even imply what guidelines or standards the trial court and/or the jury would
use in determining if and when the defense can be applied, how the defense may be
applied, what standard of proof must be met in order for the defense to apply, what facts
must be proven and established before the defense can be asserted, what standard of
proof must be applied to the facts supporting the assertion of the defense before the
defense can be asserted, what instructions must be given to the jury regarding the defense,
and what standard of proof the jury must find in order to make a factual finding that
alleged "after acquired evidence" had been proven and established in the case. The trial
court's written order also failed to explain its legal reasoning for permitting the appellee
to assert the "after-acquired evidence defense" in this case. (Record at pages 1153, 11961197)
10. On August 4, 2003, Ms. Pett filed a request for permission to file an
interlocutory appeal from the July 15, 2003 Order of the trial court, permitting the
defendant to file an amended answer to assert newly-discovered counterclaims and the
affirmative defense of "after acquired evidence." (Appendix at pages 1-11)
11. On September 25, 2003, this Court granted Ms. Pett's request to file an
interlocutory appeal. (Record at page 1445)
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12. On September 29, 2003, Ms. Pett filed her Notice of Appeal. (Record at
pages 1442)
VII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The "after acquired evidence defense" is nothing more than a "Wrongful
Termination For Free Card" for employers. It serves no valid purpose. It has no basis in
common law or historical precedence.
The after-acquired evidence doctrine emerged in 1988 as a complete defense in the
Tenth Circuit's decision of Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700
(10th Cir. 1988). In thefifteenyears since the "after acquired evidence defense" was first
created by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Summers, the "after acquired evidence
defense" has been adopted by only seven states.
The "after acquired evidence defense" is a judicial created defense concocted by
employers to shield themfromtheir liability for wrongful termination of an employee.
The "after acquired evidence defense" simply gives employers another way to
discriminate against employees with impunity. This Court should not adopt the "after
acquired evidence defense."
If this Court should choose to adopt the "after acquired evidence defense", it
should adopt only the most limited version of the defense, require the highest standard of
proof when relying on the "after acquired evidence defense" and provide for severe
sanctions for misuse and abuse of the defense. The misuse and abuse of the defense has
been a source of great concern of virtually all courts adopting the "after acquired
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evidence defense," since the defense was recognized in the federal system in McKennon
v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995).
However, even if this Court should choose to adopt the "after acquired evidence
defense" and make it a valid defense under Utah law, the "after acquired evidence
defense" is not applicable to the appellee in this case given the facts of this case. In this
case, the appellee has not, and cannot, satisfy any of the requirements specified in
McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852
(1995) that must be proven before the "after acquired evidence defense" is applicable.
Therefore, as a matter of law, the defense is not applicable in this case.
VHI
ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT RECOGNIZE THE "AFTER ACQUIRED
EVIDENCE DEFENSE" AS A VALID DEFENSE UNDER UTAH LAW.
HOWEVER, SHOULD THIS COURT CHOOSE TO ADOPT THE "AFTER
ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DEFENSE," IT SHOULD ADOPT ONLY THE MOST
LIMITED VERSION OF THE DEFENSE, REQUIRE THE HIGHEST
STANDARD OF PROOF WHEN RELYING ON THE DEFENSE AND PROVIDE
FOR SEVERE SANCTIONS FOR MISUSE AND ABUSE OF THE DEFENSE.
NONETHELESS, IF THIS COURT CHOOSES TO RECOGNIZE THE "AFTER
ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DEFENSE"AS A VALID DEFENSE UNDER UTAH
LAW, THE DEFENSE IS NOT APPROPRIATE OR APPLICABLE UNDER THE
FACTS OF THIS CASE.

POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT RECOGNIZE THE "AFTER ACQUIRED
EVIDENCE DEFENSE" AND MAKE IT A VALID DEFENSE UNDER UTAH
LAW.
The "after acquired evidence defense" is a judicial creation. It has no basis in
common law or historical precedence. The "after acquired evidence defense" was created
-8-

by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 864
F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
Subsequent to the 10th Circuit's ruling in Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co., employers in wrongful termination cases immediately began going through an
employee's life with a microscope in order to find any inadvertent misstatement or
omission, no matter how minor or trivial, to use as a basis for a claim that the employer
would have discharged the employee if the employer had known of the misstatement or
omission. In such cases employers would rely on any misstatement or omission,
irrespective if the misstatement or omission was related to the employee's job
performance or ability to do the job for which the employee was hired. Under the new
"after acquired evidence defense," employers received a Wrongful and Unlawful
Termination For Free Card courtesy of the judicial system.
The Summers, decision was initially rejected by the 8th and 11th Circuit Courts of
Appeal. Subsequent to the U.S. Supreme Court recognizing the "after acquired defense"
in McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct 879, 130 L.Ed.2d
852 (1995), various federal courts have continually restricted and limited its use in the
federal court system. See for example Welch v. Liberty Machine Works. Inc.. 23 F. 3d
1403 (8th Cir. 1994). Several other courts have also stated their concern and displeasure
with the defense. See Brogdon v. City of Klawock. 930 P.2d 989 (Alaska 1997), O'Day
v. McDonnel Douglas Helicopter Co.. 784 F. Supp. 1466, 1468 (D. Ariz. 1992).
As the appellee correctly points out in its response to Ms. Pett's Petition for
Interlocutory Appeal, only seven state courts have recognized the "after acquired
-9-

evidence defense" since it was first created by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in
Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.f supra, fifteen years ago and in the eight years
since the U.S. Supreme Court formally recognized the defense in the federal court system
in McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d
852 (1995).
In McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 794 F. Supp 604 (M.D. Tenn.
1992), (reversed in McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct.
879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995), to the extent that it barred Mrs. McKennon from any
recovery), the district court expressed grave concerns regarding the abuse and misuse of
the "after acquired evidence defense." The concerns expressed by the district court in
McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 794 F. Supp 604 (M.D. Tenn. 1992), have
come true in the cases in which the "after acquired evidence defense" is available. The
district court in McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co., 794 F. Supp 604 (M.D. Tenn.
1992), expressed the concern that the "after acquired evidence defense" would be used by
an employer to comb through "a discharged employee Js recordfor evidence of any and
all representations, no matter how minor or trivial, in an effort to avoid legal
responsibility for an otherwise impermissible discharge." Id at 608, citing Johnson v.
Honeywell Info. Sys.. Inc.. 955 F.2d 409, 414 (6* Cir. 1992). Similar concerns about
potential abuse of the "after-acquired evidence defense" were cited by Justice Kennedy in
McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852
(1995). The court in McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct.
879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995), stated that: "The concern that employers might as a
-10-

routine matter undertake extensive discovery into an employee's background or
performance on the job to resist claims under the Act is not an insubstantial one. "id at
363.
Virtually every court that has adopted the "after acquired evidence defense" has
expressed concern that employers will use the defense to comb through a wrongfully
discharged employee's record for evidence of any representations, no matter how minor
or trivial, in an effort to avoid legal responsibility for an otherwise impermissible
discharge. In Lewis v. Fisher Service Co.. 495 S.E.2d 440 (S.C. 1998), the South
Carolina Supreme Court addressed in some detail the abuses that could be associated with
use of after-acquired evidence by employers in employment litigation. The South
Carolina court stated:
If free reign were given, then in defending breach of employment contract
actions, less-than-principled employers (or their attorneys) may be tempted
to 'rummage the file' in order to 'discover' any and all evidence that would
permit them to escape liability.
The concerns expressed by the court in Lewis v. Fisher Service Co. were similar to those
expressed by the Alaska Supreme Court in Brogdon v. City of Klawock. 930 P.2d 989
(Alaska 1997). The court stated that:
[a]fter-the-fact justifications should be viewed with skepticism. It might be
appropriate to fashion a rule that no post-termination justification should
serve to limit damages unless it is one which all reasonable employers
would regard as mandating termination and which is, as a matter of law,
just cause for termination. Other safeguards against after-the-fact
pre textual justifications such as imposing a heightened burden of proof are
also possible.
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In O'Day v. McDonnel Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466, 1468 (D.
Ariz. 1992), the district court declared:
// is feared that employers and their lawyers will scour the employee's work
record and interview co-workers in an attempt to dig up on-the-job
misconduct that will serve as a pretext for discharge. Or, an employer
might ignore employee wrongdoing, but tuck away that knowledge of the
day that a charge of discrimination is made. Finally, an employee might
endure repeated harassment or discrimination without complaint because
she knows her work record is not spotless.
In this case all of the various courts' concerns regarding the abuse of the "after
acquired evidence defense" have occurred.
Claiming it was subpoenaing Ms. Pett's cell phone records in order to ascertain if
Ms. Pett called her supervisor, as she claimed, the appellee then used Ms. Pett's cell
phone records once obtained, as justification to subpoena records from various hotels in
Wendover. (Record at 289-290, 294-295, 299-300, 324-325, 329-330, 340-335). Using
Ms. Pett's cell phone records as justification, the appellee then subpoenaed Ms. Pett's
Bank records. (Record at 279-284).
Using the pretext that the appellee did not know who Ms. Pett's mortgage
company was, the appellee unlawfully and improperly subpoenaed Ms. Pett's mortgage
records from Fleet Mortgage Company to unlawfully and improperly obtain Ms. Pett's
bank records from Washington Mutual Bank. (Record at 222-223). Then, using Ms.
Pett's bank records unlawfully and improperly obtained from Washington Mutual Bank,
the appellee used those bank records as justification to subpoena Ms. Pett's bank records
from Zion's National Bank. (Record at 279-283).
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In its never-ending search into Ms. Pett's personal life, the appellee subpoenaed
Ms. Pett's brother James Pett's cell phone records. (Record at 339-340, 640-641). The
appellee also attempted to subpoena James Pett's medical records. (Record at 284-288).
And ignoring every court decision on the so called "after, after-acquired evidence," the
appellee subpoenaed hotel records of a trip Ms. Pett took with her brother James and his
two children after Ms. Pett had been terminated.

(Record at pages 1766-1773).

The appellee also subpoenaed the records of American Mortgage Company, even
though Ms. Pett never had a mortgage with American Mortgage Company. (Appendix at
page(s) 12-13)2. And the appellee subpoenaed Ms. Pett's employment records from
American Greetings Corporation, even though Ms. Pett had not worked at American
Greetings Corporation for more than fourteen years. (Record at pages 228-223).
The appellee is engaging in the exact type of conduct prohibited by the afteracquired evidence doctrine. In the instant matter, the appellee is not only combing "a
discharged employee's record for evidence of any and all representations, no matter how
minor or trivial, in an effort to avoid legal responsibility for an otherwise impermissible
discharge^

McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 794 F. Supp 604 (M.D. Tenn.

1992), citing Johnson v. Honeywell InfoT Sys.. Inc.. supra, the appellee and its counsel
are combing through every aspect of Ms. Pett's personal life in an effort to avoid legal
responsibility for her unlawful discharge. The incessant combing through Ms. Pett's
personal and private life for evidence of any and all representations, no matter how minor

2. This subpoena was submitted to the trial court for inclusion in the record on three separate occasions.
Nonetheless, it is still not a part of the record.
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or trivial, in an effort to avoid legal responsibility for Ms. Pett's unlawful discharge is
unjustified and prohibited under the holdings of McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub.
Co., 794 F. Supp 604 (M.D. Tenn. 1992), and Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys.. Inc.
Furthermore, the appellee and its counsel are combing through Ms. Pett's personal
and private life for evidence of any and all representations, no matter how minor or
trivial, in an effort to avoid legal responsibility for Ms. Pett's unlawful discharge, and the
appellee and its counsel are scouring through Ms. Pett's personal life after her discharge
in an attempt to dredge up anything to avoid legal responsibility for the appellee's
unlawful termination of Ms. Pett.3 Any alleged "wrongdoing" that occurs subsequent to
the termination of an employee is irrelevant and cannot justify the assertion of the "afteracquired evidence defense." See Carr v. Woodbury County Juvenile Detention Center,
905 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Miller v. AT&T. 83 F. Supp. 2d 700 (S.D. W. Va.
2000); Ryder v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.. 879 F. Supp. 534 (W.D. Pa. 1995).
In this case, the appellee has engaged in virtually every act that concerned the
various courts with respect to abuse and misuse of the "after-acquired evidence defense."
This case is a perfect example of how employers misuse and abuse the "after-acquired
evidence defense," and this case is the perfect example of why this Court should remain
among the majority of state courts that have failed to recognize or legitimize this
draconian doctrine.
1. The appellee has asserted that subsequent to Ms. Pett's termination she went to Las Vegas on gambling
trips. (Record at 1452). Ms. Pett admits that subsequent to her termination she took her brother and his two
daughters to Disneyland and that they stayed in Las Vegas on the way to Disneyland and on the way back form
Disneyland. The appellee has unlawfully and improperly subpoenaed the records of hotels in which Ms. Pett, her
brother and his daughters stayed during the Disneyland trip, that occurred subsequent to her wrongfiil termination.
(Record at 1776-1773).
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The "after acquired evidence defense" serves no valid purpose. The defense is
simply an Unlawful and Wrongful Termination For Free Card for employers. It is
incomprehensible that the judicial system would create a special immunity defense for
employers that only becomes available to them after it has been conclusively estabUshed
that they have unlawfully terminated an employee. Who ever said two wrongs do not
make a right?
POINT n
SHOULD THIS COURT CHOOSE TO ADOPT THE "AFTER ACQUIRED
EVIDENCE DEFENSE," IT SHOULD ADOPT ONLY THE MOST LIMITED
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE, REQUIRE THE HIGHEST STANDARD OF
PROOF WHEN RELYING ON THE DEFENSE AND PROVIDE FOR SEVERE
SANCTIONS FOR MISUSE AND ABUSE OF THE DEFENSE.
In Lewis v. Fisher Service Co., supra, the South Carolina Supreme Court
addressed in some detail the abuses that could be associated with use of "after-acquired
evidence defense" by employers in employment litigation. The Lewis court declared:
If free reign were given, then in defending breach of employment contract
actions, less-than-principled employers (or their attorneys) may be tempted
to 'rummage the file1 in order to 'discover' any and all evidence that would
permit them to escape liability.
Id. at 445. To address the dangers of allowing employers unrestricted use of afteracquired evidence, the court imposed two limitations on use of such evidence. M.
First, the court adopted the McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US
352, 362-363115 S.Ct 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995) standard requiring the employer to
prove that the misconduct was of "such severity that the employee in fact would have
been terminated on those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the
discharged Id. (McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 879,
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130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995)), quoted in Baber v. Greenville County. 488 S.E.2d 314, 320
(S.C. 1997). Second, the Lewis court held that "this proof must be established, not by a
preponderance of the evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence" Baber v.
Greenville County, at 320. The Lewis court went on to express its belief "that these two
limitations [would] serve to exclude doubtful or insignificant evidence of employee
wrongdoing, while allowing evidence of very severe wrongdoing that should properly be
considered."
In addition to application of the McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US
352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995), standard concerning the severity of
misconduct, the "clear and convincing evidence" standard adopted by the court in Lewis
should be adopted for consideration of after-acquired evidence if this Court chooses to
adopt the "after-acquired evidence defense" as a valid defense under Utah law. The
Alaska Supreme Court has recognized that justifications associated with the presentation
of after-acquired evidence "should be viewed with skepticism." The Court has even
suggested that "a heightened burden of proof1 might be appropriate in considering afteracquired evidence claims by employers. Given this suggestion, as well as the skepticism
expressed by the Court concerning after-acquired evidence claims, the imposition of a
"clear and convincing evidence" standard to such claims would be consistent with the
opinion in Brogdon and would assist in addressing the concerns expressed in that
decision.
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POINT III
EVEN IF THIS COURT SHOULD CHOOSE TO RECOGNIZE THE "AFTER
ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DEFENSE5' AS A VALID DEFENSE UNDER UTAH
LAW, IT IS NOT APPLICABLE UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
Even if this court should choose to recognize the "after acquired evidence
defense", the defense is not applicable given the facts of this case and, therefore, not
available to the appellee in this case.
In McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130
L.Ed.2d 852 (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court held:
Where an employer seeks to rely upon after-acquired evidence of
wrongdoing, it must first establish that the wrongdoing was of such severity
that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds
alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge.
14 at 362-363. In McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 879,
130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995), and every case thereafter, where the "after acquired evidence
defense" was allowed as a defense to an employer's wrongful termination of an
employee, there was undisputed evidence establishing that the employee against whom
the "after acquired evidence defense" was asserted had in fact committed some
cc

wrongdoing."
In McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 794 F. Supp 604 (M.D. Tenn.

1992), (reversed in McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct.
879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995), to the extent that it barred Mrs. McKennon from any
recovery), Mrs. McKennon admitted that she had a duty of confidentiality as a
confidential secretary to the staff at Banner Publishing. Mrs. McKennon also admitted
that she breached that duty of confidentiality by copying and removing confidential
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materials without any authorization. McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 794 F.
Supp 604, 607-608 (M.D. Tenn. 1992). The president of Banner stated in an affidavit that had he known of Mrs. McKennon's misconduct at any time prior to her termination,
he would have immediately fired her. Id at 608.
In all cases subsequent to U.S. Supreme Court's decision in McKennon v.
Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995), before
an employer is permitted to rely on "after acquired evidence defense" as a defense for the
wrongful termination of an employee, the employer must first establish that the
employee: 1) engaged in wrongful conduct; 2) that the wrongful conduct was of such
severity that it justified immediate termination of the employee; and 3) that the employer
would have in fact terminated the employee for the wrongful conduct if the employer had
known of wrongful conduct on the date the employer unlawfully terminated the
employee. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 879,
130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995); Sagendirf-Teal v. County of Rensselaer. 100 F3d. (2nd Cir.
1996) If an employer fails to prove that it would have taken a similar action on the basis
of subsequently discovered misconduct, the employee's relief may not be limited by the
after-acquired evidence. £e£ Ricky v. Mapco. Inc. 50 F.3d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 1995).

A*

The appellee has not established any wrongdoing on the part of Ms. Pett
Therefore, as a matter of law, the "after acquired evidence defense" cannot
apply in this case.
In order to assert the "after-acquired evidence defense" an employer must

demonstrate "that the employee has engaged in wrongdoing..."
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McKennon v.

Nashville Banner. Pub. Co., 513 US 352, 361, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995).
This case is factually different from the McKennon case or any of the other cases in
which the "after acquired evidence defense" has been applied. In this case, there is no
undisputed evidence that Ms. Pett engaged in any action that justified her termination
prior to her wrongful termination for the alleged job abandonment. At the very most the
appellee has asserted that it is entitled to file counterclaims against Ms. Pett and to assert
the affirmative defense of "after-acquired evidence" based on the appellee's assertion
that:
Recently, during the course of discovery, Autoliv discovered facts
suggesting that while Plaintiff was on short-term disability leave
(representing to Autoliv that she was totally disabled), she was apparently
able to travel, stand, sit and make numerous gambling trips to Wendover,
Nevada, and other places.
(Emphasis added). (Record at 1452), and based on the appellee's belief that: "This new
evidence suggests that Plaintiff engaged in a fraudulent scheme to avoid working yet
continue receiving herfull salary under Autoliv's disability policy." (Emphasis added).
(Record at 1452).
This new evidence suggests that Plaintiff engaged in a fraudulent scheme to
avoid working yet continue receiving her full salary under Autoliv 9s
disability policy.. (Record at page 1452).
This new evidence suggests that Plaintiff engaged in a fraudulent scheme to
avoid working yet continue receiving her full salary under Autoliv fs
disability policy. This scheme included Plaintiff's submission offraudulent
requests for short-term disability to Autoliv; having her physician sign
several medical certification forms at one time, and then submitting them to
Autoliv at various times; and, remaining on short-term disability leave for
some period when she was able to return to work (as she has admitted under oath).
(Record at pages 1452-1453).
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Ms. Pett has disputed the appellee's assertions of fact, as well as the appellee's
interpretations and conclusions regarding the alleged facts. (Record at 564-587). The
appellee and its counsel's personal interpretations of alleged facts:
suggesting that while Plaintiff was on short-term disability leave
(representing to Autoliv that she was totally disabled), she was apparently
able to travel, stand, sit and make numerous gambling trips to Wendover,
Nevada and other places
and the appellee and its counsel's personal interpretations that '"This new evidence
suggests that Plaintiff engaged in a fraudulent scheme to avoid working yet continue
receiving her full salary under Autoliv 7s disability policy;" are not facts. The appellee
and its counsel's personal interpretations of the alleged facts are not legally sufficient to
dispute the medical examinations and diagnosis of the various doctors that examined,
diagnosed and treated Ms. Pett and found her unable to work. Therefore, there is no
undisputed evidence of any "wrongdoing" on Ms. Pett's part that is necessary before the
"after acquired evidence defense" would be available to the appellee in this case.
The "after-acquired evidence defense" has never been applied to anything but
undisputed factual evidence. The appellee has not cited, and cannot cite this Court to any
case where a party was entitled to assert the "after-acquired evidence defense" based on a
party's allegations that there are 'facts suggesting or evidence that "suggests"
something. When there is a factual dispute as to whether or not an employee has engaged
in "wrongdoing", the "after-acquired evidence" does not apply. See Glassman v. Good
Samaritan Society. Inc.. 921 P.2d 224 (Kan. App. 1996), McKennon v. Nashville Banner.
Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995).
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B.

The appellee has not established that any alleged "wrongdoing" on the part of
Ms, Pett was so severe that it justified immediate termination of Ms, Pett
Therefore, as a matter of law, the "after acquired evidence defense" cannot
apply in this case.
In order to assert the "after-acquired evidence defense" an employer "must

establish that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the employee would in fact have
been terminated on those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the
discharge. McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 513 US 352, 362-363115 S.Ct.
879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995). Even assuming, arguendo, that Ms. Pett was in Wendover
on all occasions that the appellee asserts, the appellee has not established that going to
Wendover when an employee is unable to perform their work is "wrongdoing." The
appellee has not, and cannot prove, that because an employee is able to sit in a chair or
ride in an automobile, that the employee is able to work and has engaged in any
"wrongdoing" that is of such severity that it justifies the employee's immediate
termination.
Every day there are people who visit Wendover to gamble, eat or just look around,
who are in wheelchairs, on crutches, missing arms, on oxygen, and/or suffer from a
number of other disabilities and/or problems that would prevent them from performing
Ms. Pett's job for the appellee. The appellee cannot logically or honestly claim that those
people are not disabled, or that those people are able to perform Ms. Pett's job for the
appellee simply because those individuals are able to travel to Wendover and engage in
some type of activity while there.
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Because the "after-acquired evidence defense" can only be applied when there is
undisputed evidence of misconduct by a party that is so severe that it would have justified
an immediate and prior termination of that party, and because there is no evidence of any
misconduct on the part of Ms. Pett in this case, much less undisputed evidence of
misconduct that is so severe that it would have justified an immediate and prior
termination of Ms. Pett, the "after-acquired evidence defense" is not available to the
appellee in this case.

C.

The appellee has not asserted that it would have immediately terminated Ms.
Pett had it known of Mr. Pett's alleged "wrongdoing." Therefore, as a matter
of law, the "after acquired evidence defense" cannot apply in this case.
The appellee has not alleged that it would have terminated Ms. Pett's employment

based on the alleged evidence that the appellee asserts "suggests that Plaintiff engaged in
a fraudulent scheme to avoid working yet continue receiving her full salary under
Autoliv 's disability policy'' Nor has the appellee alleged that it would have terminated
Ms. Pett's employment because, as the appellee asserts: "This new evidence suggests that
Plaintiff engaged in a fraudulent scheme to avoid working yet continue receiving her full
salary under Autoliv Js disability policy "
Under the "after-acquired evidence defense" a party wishing to rely on the defense
must affirmatively assert that had it known of an employee's misconduct it would have
terminated the employee at an earlier date. McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.,
794 F. Supp 604, 608 (M.D. Tenn. 1992), citing O'Day v. McDonnel Douglas Helicopter
Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466, 1468 (D. Ariz. 1992). Because the appellee has not asserted that
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it would have terminated Ms. Pett's employment prior to her unlawful termination on
April 9, 2001, as a matter of law, the "after-acquired evidence defense" does not apply to
this case.

D. The appellee knew that on one occasion while Ms. Pett was on disability, and her
foot was in a cast and she was unable to work, that Ms. Pett went to Wendover.
Therefore, as a matter of law, the "after acquired evidence defense" cannot apply in
this case.
The "after-acquired evidence defense" is not available to an employer if at the time
the employer wrongfully terminated the employee the employer knew of the actions or
omissions of the employee that the employer later relies on to assert the "after-acquired
evidence defense." See O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co.. 959 P.2d 792, 796
(Ariz. 1998) declaring:
Of course, if the employee can demonstrate that the employer knew of
misconduct and chose to ignore it, then he will defeat the employer's
attempted use of the after-acquired evidence and defense of legal excuse.
On one occasion while Ms. Pett was on disability, her foot in a cast and she was
unable to work, Ms. Pett went to Wendover. While she was in Wendover sitting in a
chair with her foot up on another chair, Ms. Pett talked with several employees of the
appellee. In fact, Ms. Pett specifically told one of the employees to tell her supervisor,
Gary Reevs, "Hi." The evidence in this case will show that the message was relayed to
Reevs. Therefore, the appellee had actual knowledge that Ms. Pett had gone to
Wendover when her foot was in a cast and she was on paid disability.
Because the appellee knew at the time it wrongfully terminated Ms. Pett that she
had gone to Wendover while she was on disability with her foot in a cast, the appellee is
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estopped to claim that the "after-acquired evidence defense" is applicable in this case.
Therefore, as a matter of law, the "after-acquired evidence defense" is not applicable
given the facts of this case.

POINT IV
THE APPELLEE HAS EITHER WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO CLAIM THAT THE
"AFTER-ACQUIRED DEFENSE" IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE, OR THE
APPELLEE HAS ADMITTED THAT IT WRONGFULLY TERMINATED MS.
PETT.
The "after-acquired evidence defense" is only available to an employer after it has
been established that the employee was wrongfully terminated. See O'Day v. McDonnell
Douglas Helicopter Co.. 959 P.2d 792, 796-797 (Ariz. 1998). If the termination of the
employee was justified, the "after-acquired evidence defense" is not applicable. Id.
Therefore, by asserting that the "after-acquired evidence defense" is applicable to the
facts of this case, the appellee has admitted that it wrongfully terminated Ms. Pett. If, on
the other hand, the appellee wishes to assert that it properly terminated Ms. Pett for job
abandonment, the appellee has waived any right to claim that the "after-acquired evidence
defense" is applicable to this case,
The Appellee cannot have it both ways. Either, the "after-acquired evidence
defense" is not applicable to the facts of this case or the appellee is estopped to claim it
did not wrongfully terminate Ms. Pett. Therefore, the appellee must either withdraw its
assertion of the "after-acquired evidence defense" in this proceeding or be bound by its
admission that it wrongfully terminated Ms. Pett.
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IX
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR

RELIEF

Under the "after-acquired evidence defense" doctrine, a party must prove that had
it known of an employee's misconduct it would have terminated the employee at an
earlier date. McKennon v. Nashville Banner. Pub. Co.. 794 F. Supp 604, 608 (M.D.
Tenn. 1992), citing O'Day v. McDonnel Douglas Helicopter Co.. 784 F. Supp. 1466,
1468 (D. Ariz. 1992). Because the appellee has not shown any "wrongdoing" on the part
of Ms. Pett, because the appellee has not shown that any alleged "wrongdoing" was of
such severity that it justified immediate termination of Ms. Pett at any time prior to her
unlawful termination on April 9, 2001, and because the appellee has not asserted that it
would have terminated Ms. Petfs employment prior to her unlawful termination on April
9, 2001, the appellee has not satisfied the requirements necessary to assert the "afteracquired evidence defense." Therefore, as a matter of law, the "after-acquired evidence
defense" cannot apply in this case.
The appellee has not alleged that it would have terminated Ms. Pett's employment
based on the alleged evidence that the appellee asserts "suggests that Plaintiff engaged in
a fraudulent scheme to avoid working yet continue receiving herfull salary under
Autoliv 's disability policy." Nor has the appellee alleged that it would have terminated
Ms. Pett's employment because, as the appellee asserts "This scheme included Plaintiff's
submission of fraudulent requests for short-term disability leave to Autoliv; having her
physician sign several medical certification forms at a time and then submitting them to
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Autoliv at various times." Therefore, as a matter of law, the "after-acquired evidence
defense" cannot apply in this case.
Because the "after-acquired evidence defense" cannot apply in this case, this Court
must remand this case back to the district court with instructions to strike the appellee's
second amended answer, counter claim and affirmative defense of "after acquired
evidence."

Respectfully submitted this /

day of March 2004.

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Sheri Pert
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PAT BARTHOLOMEW
CLtRK OF THE COURT

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
—oooOooo—
SHERI COLLEEN PETT
Plaintiff.

PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO
APPEAL INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
Civil No. 010908813

vs.

Supreme Court No.
Autoliv, Asp, Inc.
-oooOooo—

(1)

Sheri Pett. by and through her counsel of record Charles A. Schultz, petitions the Utah

Supreme Court to permit an appeal from the interlocutory order of Judge Pamela Heffeman
entered in this matter on July 15, 2003.
(2)

A copy of the order sought to be reviewed is attached to this Petition.

(3)

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
1. Ms. Pett filed her complaint in this matter, asserting four causes of action, i.e..

Wrongful Termination of Employment, Breach of Contract Breach of Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
2. Ms. Pett subsequently dismissed her cause of action for Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress, because she and her counsel believe the standard under Utah law for proving
that cause of action is so onerous that the cause of action for all practical purposes is nonexistent.
3. The defendant answered M. Pett's complaint and asserted the following defenses to Ms.
Pelt's cause of action:
a)

Failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;

b)

The defendant acted in good faith and without malice;

c)

Ms. Pett's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is barred by the

exclusive provisions of UCA §34A-2-lG5, et. seq.;
d) Ms. Petf s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the exclusive remedy provisions of
UCA§34A-2-105.etseq.;
e)

Ms. Pett's claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver, laches and/or estoppel:

f)

Ms. Pett by her own conduct has waived or released any rights and/or is estopped

from maintaining any action against the defendant;
g)

Unclean Hands;

h)

Ms Pett has not been damaged in any manner that would permit recover of an\

damages under law;
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i)

Ms. Pett was an at-will employee and could be terminated for any reason;

j)

Ms. Pett's damages, if any. resulted in whole or part from her actions, inactions,

conduct or performance;
k)

Ms. Pett fails to allege facts sufficient to support either equitable relief or an award

of punitive damages;
1)

Ms. Pett has failed to mitigate her damages;

m)

Ms. Pett's termination was based on legitimate reasons;

n)

Ms. Pett fails to allege facts sufficient to support either equitable relief or an award

of punitive damages; (The defendant asserts this defense twice, under two different affirmative
defenses, i.e., Eleventh Affirmative Defense and Fourteenth Affirmative Defense).
o)

Offset:

p)

Attorney's fees pursuant to UCA §78-27-56;

q)

Reservation of additional affirmative defenses.

4. On or about April 16, 2003, the defendant filed a motion to file an amended answer to
assert newly-discovered counterclaims and affirmative defense of "after acquired evidence/'
(hereinafter, "the defense"), claiming that during the course of discovery, the defendant
discovered evidence indicating and/or suggesting that Ms. Pett falsely claimed that she was unable
to work when in fact she was receiving disability pay, receiving FMLA leave and using her
vacation and sick leave, that Ms. Pett falsely submitted medical forms to the defendant
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substantiating her medical problems, when Ms. Pett was able to go to Wendover Nevada and
allegedly gamble.
5. Based on this claimed new evidence the defendant motioned the trial court for
permission to file an amended answer and assert the affirmative defense of "after acquired
evidence" and a counterclaim against Ms. Pett for fraud and/or negligent representation.
6. Ms. Pett filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion because the case
was approximately eighteen months old and discovery was nearly concluded, Ms. Pett's medical
disabilities were confirmed and diagnosed by prominent and well-respected medical doctors,
permitting the defendant to file an amended answer to assert newly-discovered counterclaims and
affirmative defense would greatly delay the trial and extend the time required for the trial, and
because no Utah court has ever recognized "after acquired evidence" as a permissible defense
under Utah law. Therefore, even assuming that this Court was to recognize "after acquired
evidence" as a permissible defense under Utah law, there are no guidelines or standards for the
trial court to apply in determining when the defense can be applied, how it may be applied, what
standard of proof must be applied to the defense, what facts must be proven before the defense
can be asserted, what standard of proof must be applied to the facts supporting the assertion of the
defense before the defense can be asserted, what instructions must be given to the jury regarding
the defense, and what standard of proof the jury must find in order to make a factual finding that
"after acquired evidence" is applicable in a given case under the specific facts of that case. A
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copy of Ms. Pelt's Memorandum in Opposition to the defendant's motion to file an amended
answer counterclaim and affirmative defense is attached to this Petition so show thai Ms. Pelt
raised these issues in the trial court.
7. The defendant filed a reply memorandum in support of its motion to file an amended
answer to assert newly-discovered counterclaims and affirmative defense, admitting that the ''after
acquired evidence'* defense has never been recognized under Utah law but asserting that because
the United States Supreme Court recognized in the defense in a federal case based on federal law
that the United States Supreme Court decision was binding on the states.
8. On June 17. 2003, oral argument was held on the defendant's motion, and the trial
court granted the defendant's motion, stating that she though it would be an abuse of discretion to
deny the motion.
9. The trial court's decision was reduced to writing, and on July 15,2003, the trial court
entered an order granting the defendant's motion.
10. Ms. Pett is seeking permission to file an interlocutory appeal from the July 15, 2003
order of the trial court, permitting the defendant to file an amended answer to assert newlydiscovered counterclaims and the affirmative defense of "after acquired evidence/'

(4) QUESTIONS OF LAW:
A. Ms. Pett is asking this Court to make a legal determination as to whether or not the
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defense of "after acquired evidence" is a valid and pennissible defense under Utah law.
B. If this Court determines that defense of "after acquired evidence" is a valid and
permissible defense under Utah law, Ms. Pett is asking this Court to make a legal determination of
how and when the defense may be asserted.
C) If this Court determines that defense of "after acquired evidence" is a valid and
pennissible defense under Utah law, Ms. Pett is asking this Court to make a legal determination of
what standard of proof a party asserting the defense must meet.
D) If this Court determines that defense of "after acquired evidence" is a valid and
permissible defense under Utah law, Ms. Pett is asking this Court to make a legal determination of
what facts a party asserting the defense must prove in order to assert the defense.
E) If this Court determines that defense of "after acquired evidence" is a valid and
permissible defense under Utah law, Ms. Pett is asking this Court to make a legal determination of
what Instructions must be given to a jury regarding the defense.

(5) IMMEDIATE APPEAL NECESSARY: Immediate appeal of the trial court's order of July
15, 2003 order should be permitted because, so far as Ms. Pett has been able to determine, the
assertion of the defense of "after acquired evidence" is a question of first impress jppjunder Utah
law. Therefore, there are no standards or guidelines on if how or when the defense^Q^n be
asserted, assuming that this Court even chooses to recognize the defense.
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The United States Supreme Court's decision in Mckennon v. Nashville Banner PubFg Co.,
513 U.S. 352 (1995), recognizing the defense, in a federal case under federal law, is not binding
on any state courts. Therefore, unless and until the defense is recognized by this Court or the
Utah Court of Appeals, the defense does not exist under Utah law.
The trial court should not be permitted to allow the defendant to assert and argue a defense
that is not recognized under Utah law. Likewise, the trial court should not be permitted to allow
the defendant to assert and argue a defense when there are no guidelines or standards of when the
defense can be asserted, how the defense must be asserted, what must be proven in order to
establish the defense, what burden of proof a party asserting the defense must meet, or what
instructions must be given a jury with regard to the assertion of the defense. The trial court has
no idea of how to deal with any of these issues. Therefore, before trial can take place, this Court
or the Utah Court of Appeals must first recognize the defense and then specify the proper
standards for its application, the circumstances under which the defense may be asserted, the
burden of proof for the defense, and the appropriate instructions to the jury regarding the defense.
The federal cases have established a standard for the application of the defense in federal
cases under federal law. That standard establishes a very high standard and requires proof of
wrongdoing before the defense can be asserted. However, the trial court has chosen to ignore the
federal standard for assertion of the defense, although apparently relying on Mckennon. supra,
for its justification for permitting the defendant to assert the defense in this case. Under the
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standards and requirements for an assertion of the defense established under federal law, the trial
court could not have granted the defendant's motion to amend, file a counterclaim and assert a
new affirmative defense. Therefore, the trial court has determined that some lower standard and
unspecified standard, requiring only assertions of wrongdoing rather than proof of wrongdoing is
justification for asserting the defense. Because the trial cour* has not established any standards or
guidelines for asserting, arguing or proving the defense, this Court or the Utah Court of Appeals
must determine what standards and guidelines apply to the defense, should the defense even be
recognized under Utah law. Therefore, it is imperative that this Court permit Ms. Pett to file an
interlocutory appeal seeking this Court's review of the trial court's July 15, 2003 order permitting
the defendant to file an amended answer to assert newly-discovered counterclaims and
affirmative defense.

(7) ADVANCE TERMINATION OF LITIGATION: If this Court grants Ms. Pett permission to
take an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order of July 15. 2003 permitting the defendant to
file an amended answer to assert newly-discovered counterclaims and affirmative defense, it will
greatly advance termination of this case. If Ms. Pett is required to proceed to trial of this case and
the defendant is permitted to assert its defense of "after acquired evidence/' the length of the trial
will be substantially increased, and the case will be appealed under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure at the end of any trial. Therefore, if at the end of the trial, this Court
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ultimately rules that the defense is not applicable under Utah law or imposes as standard for
assertion, and proof of the defense that is different from the nonexistent standard applied by the
trial court, the trial will have been a total waste of time.
Because the trial court has no idea, standard or guidelines on when the defense can be
asserted, how the defense can be asserted, what the burden of proof for the defense is, what
instructions to give the jury regarding the defense, and because the trial court has chosen to ignore
the standards and guidelines established under federal law relative to the defense, it is a certainty
that this Court or the Utah Court of Appeals will adopt standards and guidelines that are
substantially different from the nonexistent standards and guideline the trial court has chosen to
apply to the defense.
If after trial of this case, this Court or the Utah Court of Appeals establishes standards and
guidelines for assertion, proof and relief under the defense that are substantially different from the
nonexistent standards and guidelines used by the trial court in the trial of this case, Ms. Pett will
be entitled to a new trial of this case, even assuming that this Court or the Utah Court of Appeals
determines that the defense exists under Utah law and assuming that it is further determined that
assertion of the defense, if it is determined that the defense exists under Utah law, was
appropriate under the facts of this case. Trial of Ms. Pett's case under the nonexistent standards
and guidelines of the trial court would, therefore, be a waste of time for everyone.
Because permitting Ms. Pett to file an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's July 15,
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2003. order permitting the defendant to file an amended answer to assert newly-discovered
counterclaims and affirmative defense, it will greatly advance tennination of this case, this Court
should grant Ms. Pen's Petition.

Respectfully submitted this /

day of August 2003

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Sheri Pett
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CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE

I hereb} certify that on the ^ '

day of August 2003.1 Hand Delivered a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Petition to the persons at the address:

Rick Thaler
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
36 South State St. #1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake Citv. Utah 84145-1500

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Sheri Pett
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JANET HUGIE SMITH (A3001)
FREDERICK R. THALER (A7002)
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
Post Office Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
(801)532-1500
Attorneys for Defendant Autoliv ASP, Inc.

IN THE SECOND D [STRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SHERI COLLEEN PETT,
Plaintiff,

j
1

vs.
AUTOLIV ASP, INC.,

SUBPOENA FOR THE PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS
Civil No.: 010908813
Judge: Pamela G. Heffeman

Defendant

TO:

Custodian of Records
American Mortgage Co.
1492 East Ridgeline Dr., Suite #120
South Ogden, UT 84405

YOU ARE COMMANDED to produce and permit inspection and copying of the
following documents at the offices of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 36 South State Street, Suite
1400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on or before April 30,2003, at 9:00 sum.:
All documents concerning, relating to or referring to Sheri Colleen Pett,
including, but not limited to all financial records, insurance documents, mortgage
or second mortgage documents, title policies, endorsements, title commitments,
tax sheets, write up sheets, abstracts, trust deed order sheets from CU Platte,

including the comprehensive file maintained on Sheri Colleen Pett, including any
office records maintained by any or all managers, supervisors, or directors.
In lieu of producing the originals of such documents, you may furnish complete and
accurate copies thereof, together with an itemized statement for the reasonable cost of such
copies, which will be paid upon receipt.
Your rights and obligations with respect to this Subpoena are set forth in the Notice of
Persons Served with a Subpoena, which is attached to this document.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this X_ day of April, 2003.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER

T
Janet Hugie Smith
Frederick R. Thaler
Attorneys for Defendant Autoliv ASP, Inc.
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